Book Review by Joel VanDixhorn
World War IV
By Norman Podhoretz
Doubleday
ISBN 9780385522212
Nowadays, being labeled a neoconservative can have a crippling and paralyzing effect, in both the political and academic spheres. The title has become associated with warmongering, the war in Iraq, and everything the Left hates about the Bush administration. In World War IV, Norman Podhoretz argues that America is currently engulfed in a worldwide ideological and military battle reminiscent of the Cold War (which he calls World War III). The self-described neocon articulately and unapologetically defends the Bush Doctrine. World War IV works to correct misconceptions and combat outright lies that surround Bush and the foundational theories of his doctrine. This encourages individuals to view neoconservatism as a legitimate school of thought as opposed to a maliciously smeared cult ideology.
Neoconservatism, according to Podhoretz, is rooted in a comprehensive interpretation of international politics. For example, it explains how the startling number of terrorist attacks perpetrated against American citizens and soldiers across the globe have not been simply random events. Instead, they represent a conscious effort by transnational terrorists, often acting with state backing, to wage war on the US. If this view is accepted, it becomes easy to see how the serial inaction that subsequently follows most acts of terror plagues this nation.
Podhoretz profiles most of the attacks of the past three decades, from the seizure of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum by the Black September Organization to September 11. Despite the recurrence of attacks, the US sat on its hands, yielding to the naïve hope that our troubles could be solved through diplomacy. Podhoretz draws the obligatory historical parallels to Hitler and Stalin. He also illustrates a recent example of how US complacency has horrendously backfired. He tells a story not of the US embassy that was seized in Tehran, but of the Soviet embassy that was not only spared, but offered protection from the radical Ayatollah Khomeini, despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The difference in treatment “could not be explained by ideological or political factors,” argues Podhoretz, since “radical Muslim fundamentalists…hated communism…at least as much as they hated us.” In fact, the difference lay in the expectation that the US “would go to any lengths to avoid the use of force.” In short, self-imposed impotence emboldened the terrorists.
Aware of the historical baggage that he inherited, President Bush set out to alter the course of US foreign policy. Not considered a visionary at the inception of his presidency, 9/11 forced the president to abandon his father’s “realist” mantra. Out of the chaos came the Bush Doctrine. While liberals off-handedly dismiss it as a mindless, unconscionable theory devoid of academic value, the doctrine is actually a complex synthesis of influential theorists’ works and previous presidential doctrines. The first “pillar” of the Bush Doctrine was based on the rejection of moral relativism, a movement which is becoming increasingly pervasive in our culture. Simply by using the word “evil” in speeches to describe terrorists and their sponsors, Bush, in a very Reagan-esque manner, showed that he meant to take a moral as well as a political stand against Islamist extremism. For this, he has been rebuked as simpleminded.
The next element of the doctrine stated that terrorism is bred through political oppression, as opposed to poverty. This necessitated the facilitation of regime change as the only true way to uproot terror networks. The logical extension of this belief is the most controversial part of the doctrine: the right of the US to wage preemptive warfare. Preemption, to Bush, is the alternative to strategic arms control and containment, both employed during the Cold War but both unable to account for the evolving international scene.
Perhaps the most important part of the book is the author’s thorough analysis of the Democratic Party during the Bush presidency. In the chapter “The Radicalization of the Democrats,” he explains that many of the speeches for which Bush is criticized contained content already presented by the Clinton administration. For example, in a 1998 speech, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated, “the risk that the leaders of a rogue state [Iraq] will use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons…is the greatest security threat we face.” A multitude of quotes came from the Clinton camp that reinforced the danger of WMD in Iraq yet these stances were all but forgotten half a decade later.
Podhoretz also clarified facts regarding the intelligence failure leading up to the Iraq War. Unbeknownst to most Americans, former CIA director George Tenet “had the backing of all fifteen agencies involved in gathering intelligence for the US” when he stated that Saddam Hussein had WMD. This is a far cry from the claim that Dick Cheney or Donald Rumsfeld completely distorted documents and withheld evidence regarding Iraq. The most revealing quote comes from John Edwards, who said, “I personally think there’s some dishonesty in suggesting that members of the US Senate relied on George Bush for that information…It’s great politics. But it’s not the truth…”
World War IV is an excellent read, presenting the demonized neocon ideology in an intelligent, logical, and unassuming manner. It is packed with verifiable facts and shocking quotes from Democrats as well as international terrorist leaders. It should be read by anyone who truly cares about real debate and America’s global role in the 21st century.
Mr. VanDixhorn is a junior majoring in Political Science.
Comments